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Erlander...

(Forts. från sidan 1)

"Inte den bestulnes sak berätta var tjuvgodset finns"

Repliken återgavs i fru Bellanders talningsprotokoll från sammanträdet, som publiceras i senaste numret av Vecko-Journalen.

Protokollet innehåller en rad uppgifter om vad som yttrades under mötet utöver vad som tidigare framgick av advokat Yngve Schar-
taus uttalande för Dagens Nyheter. Det visar sig bl a att statsminister Erlander fick en skarp tillrättavisning av hr Undén för att han i utrikesministerens frärvare vågat uttala sig positivt om Wallenbergss-
aktionens verksamhet.

Enligt protokollet förklarade hr Undén att Raoul Wallenberg mycket väl kunde ha omkommit under striderna vid Budapest, ett påstående som kommittén gendrev med att den genom sina vittnen visade att Raoul Wallenberg var i ryska fångenskap. Fru Bellander påpekade dessutom att ryssarna själva givit ett kvitto på att de har tagit Raoul Wallenberg.

Undén: "Men kan man förstå då varför de skulle hålla honom fängslad, fru Bellander?"

Fru Bellander: "De misstänkte honom för ett ryskt spion. Ryssarna försöker ju inte något sådant som humanitärt arbete. De tyckte väl att det var något misstänkt med en människa som utsatte sig för den största livsriik för att rädda främmande människor."

Ur det fortsatta samtalet kan följande repliker återges.

Undén: "Men hur kan ni begära att ryssarna skall komma ta reda på var Raoul Wallenberg finns, om ni inte själva vill tala om det för dem?"

Fru Bellander: "Det är inte den bestulnes sak att berätta för tjuven var han lagt sitt tjuvgods! Det är ryssarna som har redovisningsskyldighet för oss, inte vi för dem. Och för resten, om vi skulle säga dem var Wallenberg fanns — i det fängelset och den cellen för fjorton dagar sedan — skulle de självklart förflytta honom till ett annat fängelse och säga: Han var tyvärr inte där."

Undén: "Den här så kallade Wallenbergaktionen vad ska den nu vara bra för? Den är bara till för att jagar upp en känslostorm hos allmänheten."

Fru Bellander: "Vi gör inte upp en känslostorm. Vi stöder oss på fakta och bevis. Men det skulle nog inte skada med lite mera känsla i den här saken från er sida. Här talas i ex-hela tiden om 'fallet Wallenberg'. Det är inte ett fall utan en mänsklig sak som gäller. För resten har vi nått ett resultat som det hittills inte lyckats UD att få. Vi har fått svar från ryssarna i augusti."

Undén uppbragt: "Det var inte ett svar till aktionen, utan till UD efter vårt utröstliga arbete, efter Söderbloms förfrågningar i Moskva."

Fru Bellander: "Vi får väl räkna det som femtio procent till oss var då."

Undén: "Femtio procent! Nej, vet fru Bellander, det är ju löjligt, femtio procent!"

Fru Bellander: "Jag citerar bara det statsministern sade till ingenjör von Dardel och mig då vi efter det ryska svaret besökte honom."

Undén vände sig häftigt mot Erlander: "Har du sagt det?"

Erlander generad: "Jo, det var när du var börtrest i augusti som fru Bellander och ingenjör von Dardel var uppe hos mig, och då kom vi överens om att betrakta det så."

Undén rannlade förargat, och Erlander såg mycket deprimerad ut, heter det i protokollet.

Fru Bellander: "Vi kommer inte ett uppge arbetet förrän vi nått ett resultat. Vi tror mer på uttalandet av fyra trovärdiga, aktade svenska medborgare, dvs undersökningskommitténs utsagor, än på svaret av en representant från en diktaturstat, som har all anledning att dra sig ifrån ansvaret."

Undén: "Menar fru Bellander att Vysjinskij ljugar?"

Fru Bellander: "Ja, det menar jag."

Undén: "De är ju oerhört! Det är ju oerhört!"

När vi bröt upp sade Anders Örn till Undén:

"Vi hoppas och tror att det skall komma den dag då svenska regeringen och UD ej skall kunna underlåta att kräva Raoul Wallenberg tillbaka."



22 Februari 1957

A EISI

ÄTT
EPOTT

*Erlander
fick skrapa
av Undén*

"Kan man förstå varför ryssarna skulle hålla Raoul Wallenberg fängslad?" frågade utrikesminister Undén fru Birgitta de Vylder-Bellander vid det beryktade sammanträdet på Kanelihuset den 3 november 1947 mellan å ena sidan stats- och utrikesministrarna och å andra sidan representanter för Raoul Wallenbergsaktionen. Forts. sista sidan, spalt ett.

22 Feb 57

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Referat av Wallenbergsamtal tendenciöst, säger hr Undén

Den framställning som Wallenbergsaktionen givit i Vecko-Journalen och som efter denna tidning i går återgavs i Dagens Nyheter av ett samtal 1947 mellan utrikesminister Undén och Wallenbergsaktionen betecknar hr Undén i ett uttalande i Morgon-Tidningen som "i hög grad tendentiös". Morgon-Tidningen frågar om advokat Schartaus referat av samtalet är riktigt och utrikesministern svarar:

— Naturligtvis inte, svarar hr Undén. Det är i hög grad tendentiöst. Men min ståndpunkt är att det var fråga om ett förtroligt samtal och att samtalet alltså inte varit avsett för offentligheten. Det har tydligen också varit hr Schartaus åsikt. Annars skulle han inte ha hållit sina anteckningar gömda i sitt kassaskåp i tio år.

Bakgrunden till samtalet var att regeringen ville i all vänlighet förstå Wallenbergskommittén att ställa sitt förment viktiga material till UD:s förfogande. Man klagade på UD:s bristande energi, men undanhöll departementet sitt material. Denna inställning hos kommitténs medlemmar förklarar att det var de som visade aggressivitet under samtalet. De bemöttes förutom av mig av utrikesrådet Grafström som tvärtemot vad hr Schartau påstår gjorde flera inlägg under sammankomsten.

Kommitténs vägran att ge UD del av allt material motiverades bland annat med att en tjänsteman i UD skulle ha sagt att vissa påstadda bevis inte var tillfredsställande. Detta uttalande skulle ha skadat saken gentemot Sovjet. Det är underligt att kommittén inte tyckte ha reflekterat över vilken skada som kunde vållas saken av sådana uttalanden som dess betrodda medhjälpare hr Philipp gjort i sin bok. Han hade skrivit om Wallenbergs mission i Budapest bland annat att Wallenberg tog alla den illegala kampens risker, tvekade aldrig inför en så kallad förfalskning eller ett så kallat bedrägeri osv.

Betecknande för hr Schartaus objektivitet är att han som stöd för riktheten av hans eget och andras intyg 1947 om bevisvärdet av det hemlighållna materialet åberopar de bägge justitierådens intyg 1958, som var grundat på ett helt annat material.

Morgon-Tidningen frågar hr Undén om han tagit del av det så kallade minnesprotokoll som fru Bellander återgett i Vecko-Journalen.

— Ja, jag har just ögnat igenom detta nya dokument. Anteckningarna är författade i ett högt känsloläge, för att uttrycka mig mildt. Mina inlägg är till skillnad från de flesta andras karaktäriserade med varje-handa subjektiva uttryck, till exempel att jag röt till och blånade ilsket på hr Örne, att jag var generad, att jag yttrade mig i ironisk ton, att jag var häftig, uppbragt, påtagligt irriterad, att jag skattade häfnfullt. En replik av fru Bellander till statsministern kom honom att se deprimerad ut. Fru Bellander säger på min fråga om hon menade att Vysjinskij hade ljugit att det var hon som kommit med den berömda repliken: "Ja, det menar jag." I fru Mla Leche-Löfgrens version var det Örne som yttrade detta. Fru Bellander förbättrar skildringen med förklaringen att jag efter repliken skulle ha sagt: "Det är ju oerhört. Det är ju oerhört." Vilket nonsens, slutar artikeln i MT.

Men det är inte alls så att hr Undén i sitt uttalande uppmärksammar sig vid "tendensen" och "känslolägen" där-

emot kan utrikesministern inte bestrida att han fällt de av såväl advokat Schartau som fru Bellander återgivna replikerna. Tvärtom bekräftar hr Undén att han ställde frågan om kommittén trodde att "Vysjinskij hade ljugit" — en fråga som numera inte heller utrikesministern skulle vilja upprepa.

Vad beträffar advokat Schartaus av hr Undén kritiserade intyg av 1947 ligger det i sakens natur att det var grundat på ett annat material än justitierådets uttalande av 1958. Men slutsatsen — att Wallenberg tillfångatogs av ryssarna och förts till Ryssland — var i bägge fallen densamma. Justitierådets uttalande kan endast bekräfta värdet av 1947 års intyg.

Att hr Undén uppträtt på ett för honom själv ytterst komprometterande sätt blir alltså än en gång be-
styrkt.

RUDOLPH PHILIPP:

"Mina skildringar kunde ej försvåra befrielsen"

Från skriftställare Rudolph Philipp har Dagens Nyheter mottagit följande:

I ett uttalande i Morgon-Tidningen fredagen den 22 februari kommenterar utrikesexcellensen Undén det i senaste numret av Vecko-Journalen publicerade protokollet från sammanträdet om Raoul Wallenberg i Kanslihuset den 3 november 1947. I detta sammanhang anför hr Undén för att visa att från UD:s sida inget gjorts som kunde ha skadat saken gentemot Sovjet:

"Det är underligt att kommittén inte tycktes ha reflekterat över vilken skada kunde vållas saken av sådana uttalanden som dess betrodda medhjälpare hr Philipp gjort i sin bok. Han hade skrivit om Wallenbergs mission i Budapest bl a att vi tog alla den illegala kampens risker, tvekade aldrig inför en så kallad förfalskning eller ett så kallat bedrägeri osv."

Jag vill här till erinra om att dessa så kallade förfalskningar bestod i skydds-dokument för tusentals av nazisterna till livet hotade ungerska medborgare, i vilka, bl a, förklarades att innehavaren av detta papper inom kort skulle repatrieras till Sverige i samlingstransport. Detta "bedrägeri" visade sig vara ett effektivt vapen i Raouls kamp för sina skyddslingar. Raouls legala och illegala aktioner var riktade mot den ungerska pil-korsregimens terror och mot Himmlers bödler i Budapest.

Mina bok "Raoul Wallenberg — kämpe, diplomat, samarit" utkom i november 1949, alltså tjugo månader efter att Raoul Wallenberg häktats av ryska militära myndigheter och förts till NKVD:s fängelse i Moskva. Hur skulle mina skildringar av Raouls kampmetoder ha kunnat försvåra hans befrielse eller eljest — som hr Undén säger — vållat saken skada?

Varken i Moskva eller inför svensk eller internationell opinion kan det väl ha ansetts diskrediterande att Raoul som en humanitetens portförrätt-

använt sig av "olagliga" medel mot banditer och mördare.

Hr Undén förklarade vidare i sitt uttalande för MT att "regeringen ville i all vänlighet förstå Wallenbergskommittén att ställa sitt förment viktiga material till UD:s förfogande".

Det är minst sagt förvånansvärt att utrikesexcellensen alltså söker mistänkliggöra — jag syftar på uttrycket "förment" — det bevismaterial på vilket den s k Örnekommittén grundade sitt uttalande i oktober 1947 enligt vilket Raoul Wallenberg bevisligen till för kort tid sedan befann sig i rysk fångenskap. Den senaste sovjetnoten bör ha rätt undan all tveksamhet i varje fall på den punkten.

Tyvärr gick UD först i december 1951 med på att använda detta bevismaterial med de villkor vi måste ställa, nämligen att UD och regeringen, representerad av kabinetssekreteraren Arne Lundberg, i samråd och på jämställt fot med mig skulle kontrollera och använda vittnesmaterialet. Dessförinnan hade UD genom slarv och indiskretion avslöjat namn på vittnen bakom järnridån för ungerska respektive ryska hemliga polisen.

Rudolph Philipp

FRU BELLANDER:

"Vysjinskij ljög"

Från ledamoten av Wallenbergsaktionen fru Birgitta de Vylder-Bellander har Dagens Nyheter mottagit följande inlägg:

Utrikesminister Undén har i ett uttalande i Morgon-Tidningen den 22 februari kommenterat det i senaste numret av Vecko-Journalen publicerade protokollet från sammanträdet om Raoul Wallenberg i Kanslihuset den 3 november 1947.

Bl a förmodar han att detta protokoll tillkommit i "ett högt känsloläge". Detta uttryck karaktäriserar i stället hans egen attityd under sammanträdet, något som vi alla fyra frapperades av. Men då det var första gången jag sammanträdde med hr Undén hade jag ej möjlighet att avgöra huruvida hans upprördhet och häftiga uppträdande — speciellt mot hr Örne — var ett för honom vanligt och naturligt beteende, då han blir motsagd eller kritiserad. Om så är fallet, förstår jag att han inte kan finna sin egen attityd anmärkningsvärd.

Vidare betecknar hr Undén mitt återgivande av replikskiftet angående Vysjinskij svar som "nonsens". Men den enda plausibla förklaringen till att UD och regeringen under tiden 1945—1951 ej nedlagt ett kraftigt arbete i denna sak och ej förrän i februari 1952 i en officiell

lämnande är ju just den att man från UD:s sida på den tiden ansåg att Raoul Wallenberg ej fanns i Sovjet och man alltså accepterade Vysjinskij svar — rusti 1947 som sant.

Man behövde alltså endast läsa riksdagsprotokoll av den 21 maj 1951, där hr Undén ger uttryck åt samma åsikt. Hade hr Undén verkligen ansett — såsom vi gjorde — att Vysjinskij ljög (vilket ju nu visat sig vara riktigt), skulle UD:s urakurlägenhet att de ännu med kraft arbeta för Raoul Wallenbergs befrielse varit än mer oförklarlig än den är. Den skulle varit omänsklig.

Ett protokoll blir inte mindre trovärdigt därför att det är 5½ år gammalt. Tvärtom har ju händelserna 1947—1951 bestyrkt hr Undéns negativa inställning i denna sak. För övrigt har hr Undén helt undvikit att gå in på fakta i mitt protokoll och beskrider ej sanningshalten av det sakliga i protokollet. Vi har kallat det jag nedskrev under och renskrev efter sammanträdet för "minnesprotokoll" därför att jag ej av deltagarna valts till sekreterare och man ej utsett justeringsmän.

Birgitta de Vylder-Bellander

AIR POUCH

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FROM: Amembassy STOCKHOLM

964

PLSP. NO.

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,

February 25, 1957

DATE

REF: Joint Weeka No. 6, February 8, 1957.

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	REC'D	OTHER

SUBJECT: Soviet Union Alleges Raoul WALLENBERG Died in 1947.

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Summary

WALLENBERG, Raoul

No story in contemporary Swedish history has received the press and radio play given the Soviet allegation that missing Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg died in a Moscow prison in July 1947. Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko handed a note to Swedish Ambassador SOHLMAN on February 6, 1957, explaining that after an intensive investigation "the conclusion should be drawn" that Raoul Wallenberg died of a heart condition on July 17, 1947, according to a physician's report to Minister of State Security ABAKUMOV (liquidated in the Beria purge). The Soviets blamed Abakumov for concealing Wallenberg's fate and expressed their regrets. Prime Minister Erlander presided over a press conference at 4 p.m. on February 7 at which Foreign Minister Undén and former Foreign Office Secretary General Arne Lundberg were present to give the details of the Soviet reply on Wallenberg to the Swedish press. The news was first released to the Swedish public by radio at 7 p.m. on February 7. An official Swedish Government declaration issued on February 7 stated, "It must be regretted that the Soviet reply contained such meager information." Strong doubts were voiced throughout the Swedish press about the veracity of the Soviet account which was deprecated as "too convenient" in fixing Wallenberg's death at the point Swedish evidence concerning his whereabouts in Russia stopped. A white paper is to be published amplifying the material given to the press on February 6, (this press background material forms the basis of the main story that follows).

1. The Soviet Memorandum of February 6, 1957.

The Soviet reply of February 6, 1957, was the first definite news from Moscow on Wallenberg's fate since his disappearance in 1945. A long series of Swedish notes and inquiries over the past eleven years had gone either unanswered by the Soviet Government or resulted in flat disclaimers of any knowledge of Wallenberg's whereabouts or fate. This long overdue Soviet reply of February 6, 1957, was based

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2 of
a No.
Doc. No. 964
From Stockholm

exclusively on a report said to have been found in the archives of a Moscow prison hospital and addressed to the former Soviet Minister of State Security Abakumov according to which Wallenberg was believed to have died from myocardial infarct (coronary thrombosis). The body was said to have been cremated without autopsy. Wallenberg's imprisonment and the false information concerning him that had previously been supplied to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and from it to the Swedish Government was said to have been the result of Abakumov's "criminal activities". (Abakumov was executed in the Beria purge in 1954). The medical officer of the Ljublanka Prison who reported Wallenberg's death to Abakumov died in May 1953, according to the Soviet memorandum. No more documents or testimony on the Wallenberg case could be traced in the Soviet Union; the memorandum stated and it concluded with a few words of regret and sympathy addressed to the Swedish Government and to Wallenberg's next of kin. (Enclosure No. 1).

A Swedish Government declaration published simultaneously with the release of the text of the Soviet memorandum strongly regretted the meagerness of the information on Wallenberg's fate. Furthermore, the Swedish Government declared it expected that any further material in the case that might be found in the Soviet Union would be immediately communicated to Stockholm. (Enclosure No. 2).

2. Background Material Summarizing Swedish Government's Material on Wallenberg.

The essence of the huge amount of material in the Swedish Government's possession - mainly in the form of testimonies by German, Austrian and Italian prisoners of war released from Russia in recent years - tracing Wallenberg's whereabouts in Russia up to the middle of 1947 was handed to the press at the Government's press conference, and the full material will appear in the form of a white paper to be published toward the end of February. This material, previously submitted to the Soviet Government in connection with Prime Minister Erlander's and Interior Minister Hedlund's visit to Moscow in March-April 1956, does not include testimonies kept secret because of wishes expressed by those having testified who still have relatives or friends in Soviet-controlled countries, nor does it include material which, in the opinion of the Swedish Foreign Office, is of a nature as to cause serious consequences to other people if made available to the Russians.

The files on the Wallenberg case are reported to be the largest on any subject handled by the Foreign Office.

A list of the diplomatic actions taken by Sweden in recent years is attached.

and the Soviet replies.

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Page _____ of _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Classification)

Page 3 of _____
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

Since February 1952, after more concrete material on Wallenberg's imprisonment in Russia had been obtained through testimonies by former prisoners of war, at least 15 written and 34 oral notes and reminders had been delivered by Sweden in Moscow, without result until the Soviet note of February 6, 1957.

The material made public by the Foreign Office includes testimonies by 19 ex-prisoners of war, mainly German, Austrian and Italian, who either shared prison cells with Wallenberg and/or his Hungarian chauffeur LANGFELDER (also missing since January 1945) or who claim they were in communication with him by prison code ("tapping") in the Ljublanka and Lefortovskaya prisons in Moscow. These various testimonies have been checked and correlated, but they all end in July 1947, the last date any of these prisoners had any contact with Wallenberg.

Two Justices of the Swedish Supreme Court testified on March 2, 1956, that they had studied these various testimonies and had come to the conclusion, independently of one another, that Raoul Wallenberg was taken into custody by the Russians and had been kept prisoner in the Soviet Union. Their testimony coincided to such a degree on essential points that under Swedish law, it constitutes binding evidence. This finding by the two Swedish Justices was included in the material supplied by Prime Minister Erlander to the Soviet Government in Moscow in March-April 1956.

Of special significance, and underscored by the Foreign Office, all of those who shared cells with Wallenberg and/or Langfelder at different times were especially questioned by the Russians during the month of July 1947 concerning their knowledge of Wallenberg and his experiences, in Budapest and in Soviet captivity; after these interrogations they were all placed in isolated cells with no means of communication with other prisoners. In the words of the Foreign Office: "The treatment accorded these prisoners after they had been questioned suggests that the Soviet authorities sought to prevent as far as possible any further spreading of knowledge of the Swedish diplomat."

Testimony given by other ex-prisoners of war claiming contact with Wallenberg even after July 1947 is also known to be in the possession of the Swedish Foreign Office but has not been included in the material released for publication because of lack of full and definite proof of its accuracy. Also, numerous alleged testimonies have been discarded as falsifications.

The unparalleled Swedish public and press concern over Raoul Wallenberg's fate kept alive over the past twelve years demands explanation, for it has been a significant factor in Swedish-Soviet relations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4 of _____
I. No. _____
Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

Wallenberg's special mission in Budapest - he was not a career diplomat, but enjoyed diplomatic status as Secretary of Legation - was to seek to save Hungarian Jews threatened with annihilation by the Szalasi regime. By his energy, initiative and courage, it is estimated he saved the lives of some 20,000 people. "No other Swede in our history has had the opportunity in such a direct and personal way to save human lives by the thousands", said former Secretary General of the Foreign Office Arne Lundberg in his commentary over the Swedish radio on February 8, 1957.

Neutral during the war, Sweden did not experience, as many of the belligerent nations did, mass disappearance of nationals, so that the fate of one single Swedish citizen, particularly one engaged in humanitarian relief work, went to the heart of the general public.

Sweden acted as protective power for the Soviet Union in Hungary during the war and for that reason expected sympathetic treatment of her diplomatic personnel by the Russians, (for a short time, when the Red Army marched into Budapest, Wallenberg appears to have acted as Swedish Charge d'Affaires).

The blunt Soviet denials, over all these years, of any knowledge of Wallenberg's whereabouts or very existence aroused to an increasing extent Swedish indignation as belief turned into conviction that Wallenberg was held prisoner in Russia, with all that this entailed of suffering and horror.

Another aspect of this growing indignation among the Swedish public concerned the implied suspicion that the Foreign Office had not at an early stage conducted its investigations concerning Wallenberg with the necessary concern. Apparently on this assumption, a special committee of private citizens was formed (including relatives and friends of Wallenberg's) to conduct its own search for the missing diplomat and, in general, to speed up and activate the official investigations. Swedish officialdom did not relish this implied criticism of its efforts, and there were occasions of direct clashes between the Wallenberg Committee and, notably, Foreign Minister Unden who appears to have attached more faith in the Soviet assurances that could discover no information about Wallenberg than subsequent events warranted. In any event, public impatience with the negative Soviet attitude increased through Unden's apparent inclination, at least until 1951/52, to accept the Soviet version that Wallenberg was not to be found on Russian territory.

As Italian, German and other prisoners of war began to be released from Russia toward the end of 1951, reports came through which appeared accurate about Wallenberg being or having been in Soviet imprisonment, and from then on, apparently with the Wallenberg Committee as a driving force, the Foreign Office pursued the case with added energy. Prior to this time, the case for his release had been largely ignored.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Classification)

Page 5 of _____
Incl. No. _____
Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

Arne Lundberg, who became Secretary General of the Foreign Office in 1951, and who is known to have taken on the Wallenberg case with strong personal interest and resourcefulness. A new series of notes were addressed to Moscow, beginning with a démarche of February 11, 1952, but the Soviet reply, when given at all, was always a reference to Vice Foreign Minister Vishinsky's note of August 18, 1947, disclaiming any knowledge of Wallenberg and his whereabouts.

A turning point occurred in April 1956 when Prime Minister Erlander visited Moscow. He had then occasion to present the Swedish views in person to Bulganin, Khrushchev and Molotov, and he extracted from them the promise that an exhaustive investigation would be made to ascertain Wallenberg's fate.

Again, however, the Russians saw fit to try the Swedish patience, for despite repeated reminders it was not until ten months later, on February 6, 1957, that the Soviet reply was given, stating that Wallenberg, on the strength of the meager evidence supplied, could be expected to have died in the Ljubanka Prison in Moscow on July 17, 1947.

3. Swedish Press Skepticism Toward Veracity of Soviet Explanation of February 6.

The long-overdue Soviet reply definitely did not satisfy Swedish opinion. Press commentaries were unanimous in describing the Soviet evidence, comprising one single document issued by a person now deceased and addressed to another also deceased (executed), as inadequate. The press also pointed to the vague, almost non-committal wording of the Soviet note, which stated there was "reason to look upon the document as referring to Raoul Wallenberg" and that "the conclusion should be drawn that Wallenberg died in July 1947". Main emphasis in the commentaries, however, was placed on the "convenient" timing of Wallenberg's alleged death with the testimonies in Swedish possession whereby Wallenberg was last heard of in July 1947, when prisoners of war had been interrogated by the Russians concerning Wallenberg and thereafter placed in isolated cells. The timing was also held to be interesting in view of the fact that in July 1947 Swedish Ambassador Sohlman in Moscow had made a renewed démarche to the Soviet Foreign Office, to which Vishinsky had replied by his negative note of August 18, 1947.

Although few commentators doubted that Raoul Wallenberg must now be dead, the Soviet version as to the timing and other circumstances met with profound skepticism and dissatisfaction in all quarters. Even the alleged cause of death - "myocarditic infarct" - was strongly questioned, and prominent Swedish heart specialists immediately declared this type of heart ailment highly improbable in a man of Wallenberg's age (he would have been 36 in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page _____ of
Desp. No. _____
From _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Classification)

Page 6 _____ of
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

July 1947).

The attempt on the part of the present Soviet rulers to cast all the blame for Wallenberg's arrest and imprisonment on the Stalinist regime and its hirelings was neither accepted by the press, which held that the treatment of an innocent neutral diplomat in the described fashion cast reflection on the whole Soviet system, with its inherent terror and disregard for human life, irrespective of who may for the moment be the rulers.

For all of the above reasons, there was a strong press urge that the Swedish Government not let the matter rest but that investigations continue in search of new evidence on Wallenberg's fate and that, meanwhile, new representations be made in Moscow demanding more information on why Wallenberg was imprisoned and what treatment he had been given.

Obviously, the Swedish Government is resolved to pursue its efforts to bring about full clarity in the Wallenberg case. This was implied in the immediate Government declaration following publication of the Soviet note on February 7 as well as by statement to the press by the Foreign Office that a Swedish reply to Moscow was under preparation.

Pending such a new Swedish démarche, Communist Ny Dag on February 19 featured an interview with its Moscow correspondent had with Gromyko, the new Soviet Foreign Minister, in which the latter was quoted as having declared that nothing further could be obtained concerning Wallenberg's fate beyond what was contained in the Soviet note of February 6, and that "the Wallenberg case should be considered closed".

Rather than quieting Swedish public opinion, this statement by Gromyko has further activated the demand here for the full story on the fate of an almost idolized Swedish citizen fallen the victim of a totalitarian police state. END OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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4. The Mystery of the Wallenberg Mission

Raoul Wallenberg, a cousin once removed of Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg, the bankers, was assigned to the Swedish legation in Budapest in 1945 in a special capacity to exercise good offices on behalf of the Jews who were being subjected to Nazi atrocities. All accounts claim that he issued Swedish documents and passports to many Jews in Hungary in order to aid them in escaping the Nazi terror. He was supplied with 260,000 Swedish crowns some time in 1945 by the United States War Relocation Authority, (according to information from the Legation of Embassy Stockholm which was

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Page _____ of _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification)

Page 7 of _____
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

conveyed to the Swedish Government by note from the Department of State in Washington on May 1, 1951). A sum of 10,000 Swedish crowns was given Wallenberg through a third person in Stockholm to finance his travel to Budapest. Subsequent payments of 50,000 and 200,000 Swedish crowns were deposited to his account in the Stockholm Enskilda Bank. The 200,000 Swedish crown payment was given by the American Joint Distribution Committee and since Wallenberg used "very little of it, the remainder was later returned to the Committee".

A current explanation of why Wallenberg was liquidated by the Russians was because they believed he was an American spy. Rudolph PHILIPP, the Secretary of the Wallenberg Committee, (a group of distinguished Swedish citizens), once claimed that Wallenberg had been on a secret mission for President Roosevelt. Many Swedish officials have noted to the reporting officer that Wallenberg was a close friend of former American Minister Herschel JOHNSON and that he was the one who is supposed to have picked Wallenberg for his "dangerous mission".

In any event, there is no concrete evidence available so far to clarify whether or not Wallenberg was engaged in espionage activities or a secret or confidential mission for any foreign power.

5. Foreign Office Reactions on Soviet Reply.

In a general discussion of the Wallenberg case, the Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Foreign Office explained that three things about the Soviet reply of February 6, 1957, had surprised the Foreign Office. The first surprise was that any answer had been given; there existed a strong suspicion in the Foreign Office at the working level that the Soviet Union would never give any detailed sort of reply and was not expected to go beyond its previous notes saying it had no information. The second surprise concerned the language of the Soviet memorandum. Obviously, according to the Foreign Office, every word of the Soviet message had been weighed and undoubtedly went through many drafts. For such a note to use such vague language as "the conclusion should be drawn" and the lack of precision in identifying the prisoner who died as Raoul Wallenberg, means, as the Foreign Office interprets it, that the Soviet Government is still free to adopt another interpretation if it chooses. The third surprise to the Foreign Office was that the Soviet memorandum seeks to align the Swedish Government on the side of the present Kremlin regime in its denunciation of Beria.

The Foreign Office was far from satisfied with the Soviet reply to the many inquiries concerning Wallenberg. However, the Foreign Office believes it has no rational alternative now but to believe that Wallenberg is dead. It would still like to obtain more

CONFIDENTIAL

Page _____ of _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

CONFIDENTIAL
(Classification)

Page 8 of _____
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

details of his imprisonment.

Foreign Office officials remain puzzled as to why the Soviet note was sent at this time and are still not sure of its full significance. These explanations are still under consideration: (1) it was an attempt to remove obvious misunderstandings before the new Soviet Ambassador GUSEV arrives; (2) by sending what it might have been a "conciliatory" note with an unprecedented expression of "regrets", this action becomes part of the new Soviet campaign to woo the Nordic countries; (3) this "patently contrived" account, delivered to stop further inquiries, was a Soviet Foreign Office miscalculation of how seriously the Swedish people considered the Wallenberg case; and (4) the explanation given by the Soviet Union is true, and the Soviet Foreign Office sent the information as soon as it obtained it. Whatever the explanation, Bureau Chief opinion insists that as a result of the Soviet reply alleging that Wallenberg died in a Moscow prison, Swedish-Soviet relations have been significantly worsened.

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For the Ambassador:

Joseph Sweeney
Joseph Sweeney
First Secretary of Embassy

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Page 1 of 1
Encl. No. 1
Disp. No. 964
From Stockholm

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 6, 1957, BY SOVIET VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO TO SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW ROLF SOHLMAN IN THE RAOUL WALLENBERG CASE

(Translation of text as released by the Swedish Foreign Office to the press February 7, 1957)

In pursuance of the Swedish Government's request, the Soviet Government instructed the pertinent Soviet authorities to peruse the material concerning Raoul Wallenberg which had been received from Swedish quarters at the Swedish-Soviet negotiations in Moscow in March - April 1956 and also in May 1956. In the course of perusal and testing of the said material, the Soviet authorities have made a careful search of the archives which refer to the accounting for prisoners and to investigation questions ("Sledstvennye Dela"), for the purpose of finding possible information on Wallenberg. Similarly, many persons have been questioned who could have had anything to do with the circumstances mentioned in the material received from Sweden.

As a result of these measures, however, it has not been possible to find any information whatsoever concerning Wallenberg's sojourn in the Soviet Union. It has transpired that none of those heard knew any person by the name of Wallenberg. In this connection, the competent Soviet authorities have undertaken a search page by page of the archive documents from all wards in certain prisons. As a result of such search of archive documents from the health service in the Ljubanka Prison, a document has been found which there is good reason to consider as referring to Raoul Wallenberg.

This document has the form of a hand-written report, addressed to the former Minister of the State Security in the Soviet Union, Abakumov, and written by the head of the health service at the said prison, A.L. Smoltsov, reading as follows:

"I report that the prisoner Wallenberg, who is well known to you, died suddenly in his cell this night, probably as the result of a heart attack. Pursuant to instructions given by you that I personally have Wallenberg under my care, I request approval to make an autopsy with a view to establishing the cause of death.

"July 17, 1947.

"Smoltsov,

"Chief of the Prison's Sanitary Ward,

"Colonel in the Medical Service."

On this report, the following notation is found, in Smoltsov's handwriting: "I have personally notified the Minister and it has been ordered that the body be cremated without autopsy. July 17. Smoltsov."

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(Classification)

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2 of
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

It has not been possible to find any other information whatsoever having the character of document or testimony, all the more since the aforementioned A. L. Smoltsov died on May 7, 1953. On the strength of what has been cited above, the conclusion should be drawn that Wallenberg died in July 1947.

Raoul Wallenberg was apparently arrested along with other persons in the area for military operations by Soviet troops. At the same time, it may be considered indisputable that Wallenberg's subsequent detention in prison as well as the incorrect information about him supplied by certain former leaders of the security organs to the Soviet Union's Foreign Ministry over a period of years comprised the result of Abakumov's criminal activities. In connection with gross crimes committed by him, it will be recalled that Abakumov, who had engaged in activities implying violation of the laws of the Soviet Union and who had sought to inflict upon the Soviet Union all kinds of damage, was executed in accordance with verdict handed down by the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government presents its sincere regrets because of what has occurred and expresses its profound sympathy to the Swedish Government as well as to Raoul Wallenberg's relatives.

Translation: NMöller

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(Classification)
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Page 1 of 2
Encl. No. 2
Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

OFFICIAL COMMENTARY BY THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT TO THE SOVIET
MEMORANDUM ON RAOUL WALLENBERG, ISSUED FEBRUARY 7, 1957.

The Soviet Government has drawn the conclusion from its investigations that Wallenberg died in a Russian prison in July 1947. The responsibility for his having been detained in prison and for the false information previously supplied is placed on the Soviet security organs and the Soviet Government expresses its sincere regrets for what has occurred.

Concerning the reply, it can be established that it is now being admitted on Russia's part that Wallenberg has been held imprisoned in the Soviet Union. In that respect, the reply tallies with the Swedish evidence material. It must be strongly regretted, however, that the reply contains such meager information. Nothing is said about the motives for Wallenberg's arrest or about his fate during the years that followed. We expect that if any new material should appear in the Soviet Union we shall immediately have it communicated to us.

To Raoul Wallenberg's mother and relatives, who for so many years have had to live in horrible uncertainty, the Russian reply must imply yet another hard blow. They have our profound sympathy.

Translation: NMøller

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Page _____ of _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

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(Classification)

Page 1 of _____
Incl. No. 3
Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

EXCHANGES BETWEEN SWEDEN AND THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING
RAOUL WALLENBERG 1945 - 1957.

Among the numerous inquiries and reminders, formal as well as informal, made by the Swedish Minister in Moscow to the Soviet Government, and by the Foreign Office in Stockholm to the Soviet Minister since 1945 concerning Wallenberg's whereabouts, the following major exchanges took place:

- 11/31/1945 Swedish note submitted to Vice Foreign Minister DEKANOSOV requesting an exhaustive account of the results of the search made by the Soviet authorities concerning Wallenberg.
- 12/12/1946 D marche made by the Swedish Legation in Moscow giving a list of previous Swedish inquiries concerning Wallenberg.
- 8/18/1947 Soviet Foreign Ministry, following renewed Swedish representations, stated that investigations had produced no result, and that it could be presumed that Wallenberg had either been killed during the fighting in Budapest in January 1945 or had been taken prisoner by Hungarian Fascists.
- 12/11/1951 Swedish Government demanded that the Soviet Union take the necessary measures for Wallenberg's early return to Sweden.
- 4/16/1952 Soviet Government replied by stating that it possessed no further information beyond that contained in its note of 8/18/1947.
- 5/23/1952 Note submitted to Soviet Ambassador RODIONOV in Stockholm, and simultaneously through Swedish Embassy in Moscow to Vice Foreign Minister Zorin, inquiring whether Soviet Government prepared to make further inquiries if supplied with material collected in the course of Swedish inquiries.
- 8/5/53 The two Swedish d marches in Stockholm and Moscow replied to by Ambassador Rodionov advising that earlier Soviet information in the case had been "confirmed" and that any attempt to connect Wallenberg's fate with his alleged sojourn in the Soviet Union would be wholly futile.

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Page _____ of _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

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7058
Incl. No. 3
Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

- 9/29/1954 Extensive memorandum on results of Swedish search for Wallenberg submitted to Soviet Government, based among other things on new evidence in the possession of the Swedish Foreign Office confirming earlier conclusions that Wallenberg was a prisoner in the USSR.
- 3/10/1956 Foreign Minister Undén handed Soviet Ambassador Rodionov in Stockholm a note detailing new material obtained following inquiries among Austrian and German citizens returned from Soviet prisons.
- 3/19/1956 Soviet note to Swedish Embassy in Moscow "confirming" that all statements previously made that Wallenberg was not to be found on Soviet territory were final, and declaring that nothing further could be added.
- 3/29 -
4/5/1956 Prime Minister Erlander and Interior Minister Hedlund conferred in Moscow with Soviet leaders and Soviet Government agreed to Swedish request for renewed investigation concerning Wallenberg on basis of new evidence and other material submitted to Moscow.
- 7/14/1956 Ambassador Rodionov advised the Swedish Foreign Office that information resulting from new Soviet investigations concerning Wallenberg could be expected "shortly".
- 9/29/1956 Swedish Embassy in Moscow instructed to lodge a new reminder with the Soviet Foreign Office, pointing out that six months had elapsed since the Soviet Government undertook to investigate new material on Wallenberg.
- 11/13/1956 Sharp Swedish reminder lodged with Soviet Foreign Office expressing surprise and great disappointment that Soviet promises had not yet been implemented.
- 2/6/1957 Soviet reply stating that Wallenberg died in a Moscow prison in July 1947.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

989

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

March 5, 1957

DATE

Embassy Despatch No. 964, Feb. 25, 1957;

REF : Joint Weeka No. 8, Feb. 21, 1957.

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER

SUBJECT: Sharp Swedish Note to Soviet Union Regarding Russian Memorandum of February 6, 1957, on Wallenberg Case.

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

WALLENBERG, RAOUL

The Swedish Government sent a sharply worded note to the Soviet Union on February 19, 1957, in answer to the Russian memorandum of February 6th which contained the information that Wallenberg had died in a Soviet prison. In unusually strong critical language the Swedish Government implied that it did not consider the Soviet Union's answer satisfactory. To make sure that there could be no misunderstanding of its position, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs released the full text of the Swedish note to the Soviet Union to the press on February 20, 1957. A copy of the translation of this note distributed by the press section of the Foreign Office is attached as Enclosure No. 1.

The Swedish note of February 19 laid full responsibility for detaining Raoul Wallenberg in a Soviet prison and for giving incorrect information to the Swedish Government about Wallenberg on the Soviet Government. It pointedly denied that the Soviet Government could shift responsibility for these actions onto any now deceased Soviet Security Agency officials. Furthermore, the note made a specific point of the fact that "Swedish public opinion is justly shocked by what has occurred in this matter". Expressing doubt that all traces of Wallenberg in Soviet imprisonment had been obliterated, as the Soviets claimed, the Swedish Government's note requested that any further details obtained be communicated to it, and it reserved the right to send additional material concerning Wallenberg to the Soviet Government.

The entire Swedish press, including the Communist Ny Dag, on February 21st headlined the story of the Swedish note, (although delivered in Moscow on February 19th by Ambassador Sohlman, publicity did not result until the evening of February 20). The overwhelming majority of the press commended the Government for the sharp tone of its note and ran editorials again deploring the Soviet treatment of Wallenberg.

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INFORMATION COPY

Retain in files of dispatches or destroy by date of expiration.

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(Classification)

Page 2 of 2
Encl. No.
Desp. No. 989
From Stockholm

BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL

The Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Foreign Office, R. Hichens BERGSTROM observed that this was one of the strongest notes that Sweden has ever sent to the Soviet Union. He explained that it could be freely translated from its diplomatic language as saying on Sweden's part to the Soviet Union: "We think you are lying!"

If the Foreign Office had not put out a strong note and given publicity to it, there is little question but that there would have occurred a public disagreement between the Wallenberg Committee (made up of distinguished Swedish citizens) and the Foreign Office which would in turn have placed a political strain on the Government. As it turned out, the Government has had the support of a remarkably united public opinion in insisting that the last word has not been said on the Wallenberg case and that further and more energetic Soviet investigations are required to shed full and accurate light on Wallenberg's disappearance.

A concomittant of this press reaction, otherwise so decidedly in the Government's favor, has been a revived campaign by the Opposition press against Foreign Minister Undén for his alleged passiveness and lack of interest at an earlier stage of the search for Wallenberg. Testimonies by members of the Wallenberg Committee, released in Veckojournalen and similar weeklies told how Undén in 1947 reportedly took the Soviet assurances of that time as evidence that Wallenberg was not to be found on Russian territory. Several Opposition papers contained attacks on Foreign Minister Undén for his cynical attitude at that time. However, these attacks are all based on an alleged attitude that took place some ten years ago and must contend with the fact that Foreign Minister Undén is now responsible for this sharp note to the Soviet Union. On balance, therefore, it does not appear that these Opposition attacks have materially damaged Undén's unique political position in Sweden.

Foreign Office officials at the Bureau Chief level have made the point, and it is evident in terms of press reaction, that the Soviet reply finally telling of Wallenberg's death has led to a decided worsening of Swedish-Soviet relations. The present sharp note deprecating the accuracy of the Soviet Memorandum of February 6 is still another indication that Swedish-Soviet relations are at a low ebb.

For the Ambassador:

Joseph Sweeney
Joseph Sweeney
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosures:

Translation of note

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(When appropriate)

Page 1 of 1
Encl. No. 1
Disp. No. 989
From Stockholm

"Inofficial (sic) translation" released by Foreign Office

Foreign Office Press Release Wednesday, February 20th, 1957
Concerning Swedish Note to Soviet Union

A note of the following content was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry by the Swedish Ambassador Rolf Schlman on February 19th, 1957:

"In a Memorandum of February 6th, 1957, the Soviet Government declared that from their investigations regarding the Swedish Secretary of Legation Raoul Wallenberg the conclusion ought to be drawn, that Wallenberg died in a prison in Moscow during the night July 16th-17th, 1947. The responsibility for detaining the Swedish diplomat in prison and for the incorrect information which has been given the Swedish Government for many years since August 18th, 1947, is laid on the Soviet Security Agencies. The Soviet Government has expressed their sincere regret at what has happened. They have further stated, that the person among the top officials of the Security Service who was primarily responsible for the aggression against Wallenberg, was sentenced to death and executed on account of severe crimes.

"Swedish public opinion is justly shocked by what has occurred in this matter. If the Soviet Security Service was able to act in such an autocratic way as to make a diplomat of a neutral country a prisoner and keep him in prison for 2 1/2 years without reporting the case to the Soviet Government or to the Foreign Ministry, this fact is not in itself a circumstance, for which the Soviet Government can disclaim responsibility. By expressing their regret, the Soviet Government has also admitted their responsibility. To this is added the fact that, while Wallenberg was confined in a Moscow prison, the Soviet Government cannot, considering the numerous Swedish appeals, have been unable to obtain reliable information in the matter, if they had really undertaken the thorough investigations they have repeatedly assured the Swedish Government that they had made.

"In this connection it should be recalled, that as late as the day before the one reported as the date of Wallenberg's death, Ambassador Schlman reminded of Wallenberg in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Before that occasion Moscow had been reminded of this matter some twenty times after January 16th, 1945, when the Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanosov informed the Swedish Legation in Moscow, that Wallenberg had been found and taken in Soviet Russian custody.

The Swedish Government find it difficult to believe that all

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20

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Page 2 of 7057
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 989
From Stockholm

further documentation concerning Wallenberg's stay in Soviet prisons, with exception of the report mentioned in the Soviet Government Memorandum, should have been completely obliterated. They expect, therefore, that if any further material is found in the Soviet Union, destined to clarify what happened to Wallenberg, it will be communicated to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Swedish Government, on their side, reserve their right to communicate further material concerning Wallenberg that the Swedish Government consider of importance for continued investigations in the Soviet Union."

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
[REDACTED] POSSIBLE LEAD FOR INFORMATION ON SWEDISH DIPLOMAT RAOUL WALLENBERG		2. RI FILE NO.	[REDACTED]	006	107 [REDACTED]	
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE		
		[REDACTED]		05 APR 57		
5. ANALYST		6. DATE PROCESSED		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
				10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION						
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 201-005925			13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.			
PERTINENT INFORMATION						
14. WALLENBERG, RAOUL (201-005925) ON 19 FEB 1957, [REDACTED] MET IN MUNICH TWO ESTONIANS, ROMULUS MANDEL AND ELMAR LIPPING, FROM THE ESTONIAN LABOR SERVICE COMPANY STATIONED IN NUERNBERG. BOTH MUST BE PRESUMED AWARE OF [REDACTED] MANDEL REPORTED TO [REDACTED] THAT HE HAD RECENTLY MADE THE ACQUAINTANCE OF ONE E (?) WALLENSTEIN, GERMAN NATIONAL AND LATE RETURNEE FROM SOVIET CAPTIVITY IN FALL 1956, NOW RESIDING EITHER IN HEIDELBERG OR FRANKFURT/MAIN AND WORKING FOR A TELEPHONE EQUIPMENT PRODUCER. WALLENSTEIN TOLD MANDEL HE HAD FORMERLY SERVED WITH THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN BUKAREST/RUMANIA; THAT HE WAS ARRESTED BY THE SOVIETS AFTER THEY ARRIVED IN RUMANIA (TIME NOT GIVEN); THAT HE WAS SENTENCED BY THE SOVIETS TO 25 YEARS IN PRISON IN 1947; THAT HE SERVED SOME OF HIS SENTENCE IN VORKUTA. WALLENSTEIN THEN TOLD MANDEL THAT HE HAD MET THE SWEDISH DIPLOMAT RAOUL WALLENBERG IN VORKUTA IN 1955 OR 1956. WALLENSTEIN SAID THAT THIS WAS THE SAME RAOUL WALLENBERG WHO WAS ARRESTED BY THE SOVIETS IN BUDAPEST/HUNGARY IN 1945. WHILE UNABLE TO ASSESS THE VALIDITY OF THE ABOVE, [REDACTED] NOTED THE BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE WALLENSTEIN STORY ABOUT RAOUL WALLENBERG AND THE RECENT OFFICIAL SOVIET NOTIFICATION OF THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT THAT WALLENBERG HAD DIED IN THE LUBYANKA IN MOSCOW IN 1947.						
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		201-005925				

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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WCF

FBIS 61-L

STOCKHOLM SWEDISH HOME SERVICE 1800 4/24/57

(TEXT) THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS HANDED THE SWEDISH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW A NOTE IN ANSWER TO THE SWEDISH NOTE OF FEB. 19, THIS YEAR ON THE WALLENBERG AFFAIR.

THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY STATES THAT IN THE MEMORANDUM FROM THE MINISTRY ON FEB. 6, ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION COLLECTED DURING A CAREFUL AND ALL-ROUND INVESTIGATION BY THE SOVIET ORGANS CONCERNED HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD. UNFORTUNATELY, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION WHATEVER, THE NOTE ADDS.

AA 4/24-620P

Wallenberg file

ajw
RM

24 Apr 57

21-5925

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [REDACTED]

~~Secret~~
CLASSIFICATION

67-2-5/3

TO Chief, WE

DATE 7 June 1957

FROM [REDACTED]

INFO: Chief, SR

SUBJECT { GENERAL OPERATIONAL [REDACTED]
SPECIFIC Information on Raoul WALLENBERG

REF: [REDACTED] 21 May 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: As indicated in Paragraph 2, below

1. The information in reference dispatch concerning the identification of Raoul WALLENBERG in Vorikuta by a recent German returnee is being passed to [REDACTED] today, and obviously he will be keenly interested to obtain any further information which can be provided by [REDACTED]

2. The source description in paragraph 2 of reference dispatch is puzzling in its implication that the source [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] but clarification of this point would render the initial report much greater value. I would therefore welcome such clarification as well as any additional information that [REDACTED] may be able to forward.

6 June 1957

Distribution:

3 - WE

2 - SR

2 - [REDACTED]

COPY [REDACTED]

~~Secret~~
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

[REDACTED]

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Spain/Sweden

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Rumor Regarding Whereabouts
of Raul Wallenberg in 1946-48

DATE OF INFO: 1951

DATE ACQUIRED: 26 December 1957

PLACE ACQUIRED: Spain, Madrid

DATE OF REPORT: 10 January 1958

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT:

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

Appraisal of Content: C.

In 1951 a Swedish nurse or governess in the home of Swedish foreign service officer Stig Engfeldt told Source's wife that she had observed that Raul Wallenberg was hidden in the same house in which the Engfeldts lived while they were assigned to an Iron Curtain capital, probably Prague or Budapest, from approximately 1946 to 1948. Wallenberg had disappeared and was generally believed to be a prisoner of the Soviets. Engfeldt is now a First Secretary in the Swedish Embassy in Madrid.

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OPERATIONAL AND SOURCE COVER SHEET

FROM: [REDACTED] REPORT NO.: [REDACTED]
REPORT MADE BY: [REDACTED] NUMBER PAGES: 1
REPORT APPROVED BY: [REDACTED] NUMBER ENCLOSURES: None
DATE OF REPORT: 10 January 1958 REFERENCES: None
DISTRIBUTION:
By copy to: 3 - Wash
2 - Files
Orally to:

SOURCE CRYPTONYM: [REDACTED] ID NO.: IG NO.:
KRYPTON: ☐ Yes ☒ No
SOURCE, OPERATIONAL DATA, AND COMMENTS:

SUBJECT: Rumor Regarding Whereabouts of Raul Wallenberg in 1946-48.

The Station cannot judge the reliability or the significance of this information, but considered that it might be of some slight value to Headquarters. The report does not make it clear whether Wallenberg presumably was hidden in the Engfeldts' residence or simply in the same apartment building. It says, in Spanish, "Pudo observar que en la misma casa estaba escondido Raul Wallenburg. . . ." [REDACTED] further does not appear to know the exact date or city. We did not consider this worth an additional query, but possibly we could get more details in the unlikely event that Headquarters is interested. He did not even state whether or not this Swedish girl still works for the Engfeldts.

N.D.

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
		1. RI FILE NO.			
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM & DATE OF INFO.		9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION					
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO PI. FILE NO.			
PERTINENT INFORMATION					
14. Reference Document Filed Here WALLANBERG, RAOU DOB ? CIT ? 201-59250 EMIL BRUGGER [REDACTED] STATES THAT SUBJ. THE SWEDISH DTPL. WHO DISAPPEARED IN SUCHA- REST IN 45, HAD NOT DIED IN LAUSJANA PRISON IN MOSCOW IN 47, AS THE SOV. CLAIMED, BUT WAS IN FACT ALIVE IN VLADIMIR PRISON AS OF 54. [REDACTED] <i>9 Dec 58</i>					
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 21 59250					

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
6-58 GP 87

SECRET

(7-46)

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(Security Classification)
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

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FROM : Amembassy, STOCKHOLM
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

1138

June 2, 1959

REF

For Dept.	ACTION	DEPT.
Use Only	REC'D	OTHER
	6/5	

SUBJECT: Notes Exchanged Between Swedish and Soviet Governments Concerning Raoul Wallenberg.

On May 28, 1959, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement that there had been a new exchange of notes between the Swedish and Soviet Governments concerning Raoul WALLENBERG.

The most recent of the earlier Swedish notes on this subject was dated February 17, 1957, and delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on February 19, 1957. The text of this note, as well as an extensive review of the circumstances surrounding the mysterious disappearance of Mr. Wallenberg in Budapest in 1944, after the Red Army entered the city, were reported in Embassy despatches No. 964, February 25, 1957, and No. 989, March 5, 1957. A recent conversation on this subject between an Embassy officer and an officer in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was reported in despatch No. 1042, April 23, 1959.

The press release from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (English translation enclosed) stated that on February 9, 1959, the Swedish Government requested that the Soviets investigate whether Wallenberg had been held in the Vladimir prison, which is located some 200 kilometers east of Moscow. The Soviet Government's reply of March 6, 1959, stated that the investigation had been made as requested by the Swedish Government, but that nothing had been revealed and that the information of the Swedish Government concerning Wallenberg's presence in Vladimir had not been confirmed.

The Swedish press release did not indicate how long after 1947--the date the Soviet Government reported that Mr. Wallenberg had died--Wallenberg is believed to have been alive. The press reported that one of the persons who reported knowing of Mr. Wallenberg after 1947 was a Swiss, Emil BRUGGER, who stated that he had been in contact with Wallenberg in the Vladimir prison on August 4, 1954. Brugger stated that, by means of knocking on the wall, Wallenberg had given him this message: "Wallenberg--First Secretary in the Swedish Mission in Budapest, taken in 1945." Brugger stated that he replied, giving his name and stating that he had been taken from Vienna in 1948. Brugger reported that Wallenberg asked him to contact Swedish authorities if he (Brugger) was released, since Wallenberg was not permitted to have any correspondence. Another returning prisoner, unidentified, except as a German was reported to have stated that he had been in the Vladimir prison from spring to fall of 1956, during which time he had been in contact with a Soviet citizen who had been in the Vladimir prison since 1945. The Soviet citizen reported that Wallenberg had been in the Vladimir prison after 1947, the date that Wallenberg had been reported dead by the Soviet authorities.

GASTANFORD/ahm

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DST-7060, 2 June 59

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Page 2 of
Encl. No. 1138
Dep. No. Stockholm
From

A spokesman of the Resoul Wallenberg Committee, made up of friends and relatives of Mr. Wallenberg, has informed the press that there are a number of witnesses who have given testimony proving that Wallenberg was interned in various Russian prisons several years after his alleged death in 1947, and that the committee is confident that, with the help of the Swedish Government, Wallenberg will soon be back in Sweden.

In addition to the press release issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister UNDÉN made the following statement to the press: "It is difficult to judge the value of statements made by former Soviet prisoners. However, we will continue to take cognizance of any clues that may present themselves. It is an open question whether the matter will be taken up with the Soviet Chief of Government during his visit here. There is nothing to prevent this from being done. We have systematically sought to question people who have returned from imprisonment in Russia, regardless of their nationality, about Wallenberg. Some of them have made certain statements to the effect that Wallenberg was in a prison in Vladimir at a later time than that which the Russians have given as the day of his death, namely July 17, 1947. These statements caused us to turn to the Soviet Government with the request for an investigation whether Wallenberg could have been in the prison mentioned at any time after 1947. However, no new information resulted from the Russian investigation."

The Swedish press had been unaware of the renewed efforts on the part of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to learn about Wallenberg's fate and whereabouts and commended the Government for not having been satisfied with the many negative replies which it had received from Moscow. Conservative "Svenska Dagbladet" considered the latest Soviet denial to be less categorical than previously, and stated that the Swedish Government was justified in continuing to press the case. The paper suggested that Khrushchev's forthcoming visit to Stockholm in August will present "a ready opportunity once again to impress upon the Soviet rulers the burden created for Swedish-Russian relations by the unsolved Wallenberg affair." The statement on this subject by Foreign Minister Undén given above is somewhat less categorical but it is probable that the whereabouts and fate of Wallenberg will be one of the questions raised by the Swedish Government during Khrushchev's forthcoming visit.

For the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.:

Alfonzo Stanford
Alfonzo Stanford
Second Secretary

Enclosure:

Press Release.

Department please pass:

Ambassadors Moscow, Helsinki, Oslo, Copenhagen,
Amlegation, Budapest.

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UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

Page 1 of 1 **DSI 7060**
No. 1
No. 1132
From Stockholm

Ministry for Foreign Affairs Press Release, May 23, 1959.

In its note of February 17, 1957, to the Soviet Government the Swedish Government stated that it reserved the right to present further material concerning Reoul Wallenberg, which was considered to be of importance for continued investigations in the Soviet Union.

The Swedish authorities have continued to examine carefully all traces concerning Wallenberg's stay in the Soviet Union. In this connection there have been brought to their knowledge several accounts from persons, who have returned from Soviet imprisonment, implying that after 1947 Wallenberg had been in a prison at Vladimir, some 800 kilometers east of Moscow.

Because of this information the Swedish Government requested in a note, which was handed over to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs on February 9, 1959, that an investigation be made to establish whether Wallenberg had been in the Vladimir prison.

The reply of the Soviet Government, dated March 6, 1959, stated that the investigations which had been requested in the Swedish note had been carried out, but had not revealed anything new in the matter and that the information of the Swedish Government concerning Wallenberg's stay in Vladimir had not been confirmed.

Translator: M.Haijlen-Rylander

Handwritten signature

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

21 OCT 1959



TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

REC-94

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Raoul WALLENBERG

We know this individual as Wallenberg. 10/27/59

1. [Reference is made to the report made by SA Harry E. Whidbee at Los Angeles, dated 27 August 1959 and entitled [redacted] Bureau File Number 105-77801. This report contains information provided by one [redacted] concerning Raoul WALLENBERG, a Swedish diplomat who disappeared from the Swedish Embassy in Budapest in 1945. It is believed that the testimony of [redacted] as recorded in SA Whidbee's report, would be of interest to the Swedish Government and to the official Swedish sources through whom this office might channel it. It is therefore requested that this office be authorized to furnish to a usually reliable Swedish official the following information:] (U)

a. A source of undetermined reliability has stated that prior to August or September of 1944 he was employed as a [redacted] and related articles. He was well acquainted with Jews, especially those residing in the Jewish ghetto in Budapest. [redacted] WALLENBERG, whose main activity at this time was obtaining food, clothing and other services for Jewish refugees in Budapest after the war ended. [redacted]

b. The source last saw WALLENBERG in January 1945, at about the time that WALLENBERG disappeared. Source recalls that the Swedish Embassy accused the Soviets of kidnapping WALLENBERG, but he has no personal knowledge of what happened to him. The source is of the opinion, however, that the Soviets kidnapped WALLENBERG because he was assisting Jewish refugees escape from the Soviets into the West Zone of Germany.

EX-105

REC-94

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

105-77801-9

(civil)

SECRET

SEE NO-33181-1
ENCLOSURE 3

Declassify on: OADR

*let to CIA
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OCT 23 1959
[initials]*

EXP. PROC. OCT 23 1959

~~SECRET~~

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

B
c. In early 1952 the Soviets began an intense persecution of the Jews. All Jews were purged from important positions of employment in Budapest and in February, 1952, about 800 Jews were arrested by the AVO in Budapest. The source was arrested by the AVO on [REDACTED]. They never told him why he was arrested but after several days in the AVO prison he was questioned daily concerning [REDACTED].

B HUNGARY
Jewish refugees in Budapest. After several months of interrogation, it became apparent that the AVO wanted the source to testify that in 1945 he observed WALLENBERG's body in the basement of a bank in Budapest. The AVO also desired the source to testify to WALLENBERG's activities on behalf of the Jews and that WALLENBERG had frequently visited the American Legation in Budapest. The source believes that the Soviets desired to prove that WALLENBERG was an American spy and that the Americans were responsible for his disappearance. The AVO also wanted the source to testify that WALLENBERG was connected with two Jews, Miksa DOMONKOS and Lajos STOCKLER, and that they were American spies. Source was released from the AVO prison in [REDACTED].

d. In about 1954, the source met a man whose name he does not recall but who had been recently released from a Soviet prison, a mining operation located at Tomsk in Siberia. This man confided to the source that he had worked with WALLENBERG and with the source's brother, both of whom were prisoners at Tomsk.

e. The source claims that he had heard from others that the Soviets had admitted in 1955 that WALLENBERG had died in a Soviet prison in the USSR. The source can not recall now whether someone told him this or whether he read it in a newspaper.

R
2. Our proposed use of the source description, "of undetermined reliability," in paragraph 1.a. above is, of course, rather unsatisfactory in a case of this kind, and is perhaps also inaccurate. We would appreciate receiving, and being authorized to pass on to our Swedish contact, any comment you may wish to make regarding [REDACTED] reliability as an informant in this matter. (3)

CSCI-3/756,970

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

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31 A

SEE IF HE IS STILL ALIVE

By R. Philipp

STOCKHOLM. -- After the return of the Swedish Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson from his state visit in Moscow, almost all the Swedish dailies -- from the Social-Democratic main organ Stockhoms-Tidningen to the opposition Svenska Dagbladet -- published on the first page: "The Wallenberg Affair Has Not Been Settled".

Foreign Minister Nilsson had specifically summoned Wallenberg's mother and guardian and the representatives of the struggle for the liberation of this diplomat who, as the "Hero of Budapest" has not yet been forgotten in his homeland and told them, "The most important purpose of his Soviet trip had been the repatriation of Wallenberg. In connection with the great Kremlin conference referred to in the press he therefore had sought a clear answer from Mr. Khrushchev with respect to Wallenberg at a special interview in the presence of the oldest colleagues of an interpreter. Mr. Khrushchev stated: His government could only refer to the information which had been communicated by Foreign Minister Gromyko in the memorandum of 6 February 1957 to the Swedish Government."

Until 1957 the Government of the USSR had always replied to all Swedish notes that Wallenberg was never a Russian prisoner, he had never been on Soviet soil, and that he had probably lost his life due to German bombs or in any case in the battle area in Hungary.

In actuality Wallenberg, who was sent by the Swedish Government in July 1944 as First Secretary of Legation to Budapest with the special order to rescue if possible the rest of the Jews who had not been deported to the gas chambers, remained as the only foreign diplomat in the Pest part of the city, which had a population of 1,000,000, when the German troops abandoned Pest and retreated to the Buda part of the city on the other side of the Danube and the Gestapo fled by airplane with Eichmann to the Austrian border.

When the Swedish Minister summoned him to come to Buda, where all missions and consulates remained in relative security, Wallenberg asked permission to await the arrival of the Red Army in Pest and to be permitted to deal with the Soviet High Command as Charge d'Affaires in the interests of those under his protection.

On 15 January the first Soviet patrol came to Wallenberg's Legation. Wallenberg asked to be taken to the city commander. The latter, General Chernichev, "took him under his protection". Raoul asked to be permitted to drive to Debrecen beforehand, where the headquarters of Marshal Malinowski (now Defense Minister of the USSR) and the High Commissioner of the Allies, Voroshilov, were. Wallenberg received permission on 17 January to drive to Debrecen. Under escort of military police he was permitted to say goodbye to his personnel. He said to witnesses, "I am driving to Debrecen. Whether as a prisoner or a free man, I don't know."

On 10 January 1945 -- one day before this trip -- the Soviet Foreign Office informed the Swedish Minister in Moscow in a note that the military authorities had taken Wallenberg and his property under their protection.

On 30 January 1945 Wallenberg was brought to a cell in Moscow's Lyubyanka prison, where the German Attache was. After his return home the latter transmitted to us a long message of Wallenberg immediately after his transfer at Friedland.

Despite these official Russian "receipts", the Soviet authorities have denied for 12 years that Wallenberg was a Soviet prisoner. And when we had collected overwhelming evidence from many prominent returnees who

COMING UP FOR AIR

IN retrospect, many of the issues that have occupied public attention for the past six months, since the collapse of Britain's negotiations to enter the Common Market, seem largely trivial and irrelevant.

It has been a hectic period of scandal, speculation and intrigue; at times it has almost seemed as though the preoccupation with home politics was a deliberate attempt to postpone the day when the problems thrown up by the breakdown of the Brussels talks would have to be faced. Now, however, there are signs that the Government is coming up for air. With Mr. Macmillan reasserting his authority, and with a Labour landslide at the next general election no longer looking quite so inevitable as it did even a few weeks ago, the real issues of economic, foreign and military policy may at last receive the attention they deserve.

The need to look at British policy, in the light of the failure to become a member of the European Community, is made all the more urgent by the signs of a thaw in international relations. If Britain is to play an active role in exploiting the opportunities created by the Moscow test-ban agreement, we cannot go on acting as though Brussels had never happened.

At his Press conference on Monday President de Gaulle once again spelt out the basic, unresolved conflict between his view of the Western Alliance and that held by the "Anglo-Saxons." For British policy to be conducted on the assumption that this conflict can be ignored can lead only to another disillusioning fiasco.

The European Community, if it develops along the lines sketched out by President de Gaulle, is going to become increasingly self-contained. Militarily, it will dispose of its own nuclear deterrent—that of France. Economically, it will become more and more self-sufficient—with France gaining an outlet for her agricultural surpluses. Diplomatically, it will sit back sceptically watching negotiations between Russia and America.

That, at any rate, is how President de Gaulle sees it. It does not follow that the other members of the Community agree with him: his plans arouse much hostility, if only because they seem to be a means of asserting French hegemony in Europe. But it would be dangerous to count on the willingness of the Five to risk smashing the Community in order to block President de Gaulle's plans—the ultimate threat which he holds out. As in the case of Britain's application, the Five may be forced to give way.

BUT if French policy to any extent prevails, certain clear and dangerous consequences follow. On grounds of expense alone, France may be tempted to involve West Germany in her H-bomb programme: this would bring about precisely the proliferation of nuclear weapons which Britain and the United States want to prevent. It is far from certain that even the offer of American nuclear know-how or equipment, now being discussed in Washington, would stop President de Gaulle.

America is insisting that, in return, France would have to accept some measure of integration with American policy—as Britain has done; and President de Gaulle has so far shown no sign whatever of accepting such conditions.

Economically the Gaullist concept of the Common Market runs counter not only to the ideas of its founders but also to the needs of the Western world. If Europe is to move towards self-sufficiency, at least as far as agriculture is concerned, present plans for increasing trade may be threatened; already America is feeling nervously defensive about the dollar, as President Kennedy's attempts to restrict investment abroad have shown. Hopes for tariff cuts—the "Kennedy round"—could well fade away if Europe starts niggling too much about letting in American agricultural products.

If this were to happen Britain, who had hoped to extend her markets by joining the Community, would instead find them shrinking. Equally important, the under-developed countries would be seriously affected if Western trading policy were to become restrictionist instead of expansionary.

Diplomatically, too, the Gaullist approach contradicts that of Britain and the U.S. It may not matter all that much if France remains aloof from any negotiations with Russia. But it would matter if, in this respect, France were able to speak for Western Europe—and, in particular, for Germany—which is what President de Gaulle would hope to do. The effect of this would be to relegate negotiations to that far-distant day when, so de Gaulle believes, Russia will "rejoin Europe."

In all this it is Germany's role which is central to President de Gaulle's calculations. If the policies of France are more appealing to Germany than those of the U.S. and Britain he may get his way. Otherwise, he will be isolated and powerless.

IF, in the last resort, Germany were forced to choose between protection by the French or by the American nuclear deterrent, the issue could not be in doubt. But this is a difficult card for the U.S. to play: by threatening to withdraw from Europe she would reinforce the Gaullist argument that she cannot be relied upon to stay indefinitely.

In an attempt to reassure Germany and to prevent the growth of a Bonn-Paris nuclear alliance, America has put forward the proposal for a multilateral nuclear force. This would, it is argued, give Germany equal status with other members of the alliance and create an atmosphere of confidence. But it may well be that the same results can be achieved at less risk to the hopes of negotiating further agreements with Russia. And it is here that Britain could have an important role to play.

Even if Mr. Macmillan's argument that only Britain's nuclear deterrent guaranteed her a place at the Moscow talks could be accepted at face value, it does not follow that it will be a useful piece of diplomatic equipment in future negotiations. As a

Erlander handed them over during his state visit in Moscow in 1956, the Soviet Government waited almost a year before stating in a memorandum that they had found no evidence of Wallenberg's detention in any prison. Only by chance a handwritten slip of a since deceased prison doctor, in which the latter asks Security Chief Abakumov, since liquidated as an enemy of the state, what he should do with the body of a dead prisoner. Abakumov wrote on this slip: "Hold no inquest. Cremate!" This prisoner, concluded the memorandum's author, must have been Wallenberg.

Orally the Soviet spokesman stated: "We doubted the correctness of this conclusion, since there is no evidence that the diplomat was ever in Russian captivity."

The Foreign Minister of Sweden referred to the eyewitnesses, according to whom Wallenberg was in Soviet prisons at much later dates than "date of death" named in the memorandum of 1957, even in the sixties. "The work for the rescue of Wallenberg goes on," said Sweden's now foreign minister.

(cont. from page 19)

second-class nuclear Power, Britain will always be clinging to America's coat-tail. As the first Power to have renounced nuclear weapons, this country would be in a position to take an independent initiative.

In particular, Britain could insist that what really matters is for members of the Western Alliance to have a voice in the shaping of American policy. So long as it appears that only the possession of nuclear weapons guarantees such an influence, the Gaullist argument may sound convincing in German ears. Once it becomes apparent that it is possible to have influence without

necessarily owning nuclear weapons, it will sound far less persuasive.

Britain could thus challenge the whole Gaullist approach at its weakest point: the anachronistic assumption that, whether in military, diplomatic or economic matters, there is a European interest which can be pursued independently from the interests of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. Britain should be urging a realistic Atlantic strategy which would recognise America's supremacy within the alliance while seeking ways of giving its other members a voice in decision-making.

Vorwaerts, Bonn
26 June 1963

IMMER NOCH HOFFNUNG

Gucken, ob er noch lebt

Schwedischer Diplomat im Krenl verschwunden / Von R. Philipp

STOCKHOLM. — Nach der Rückkehr des schwedischen Außenministers Torsten Nilsson von seinem Staatsbesuch in Moskau publizierten fast alle schwedischen Tageszeitungen — vom sozialdemokratischen Hauptorgan „Stockholms-Tidningen“ bis zum oppositionellen „Svenska Dagbladet“ — auf ihrer ersten Seite: „Die Wallenberg-Affäre ist nicht erledigt.“

Außenminister Nilsson hatte nämlich Wallenbergs Mutter und Vormund und die Repräsentanten des Kampfes für die Befreiung dieses nicht nur in seiner Heimat als „Helden von Budapest“ unvergessenen Diplomaten zu sich gerufen und ihnen erklärt: „Das wichtigste Ziel seiner Sowjetreise sei die Heimsendung Wallenbergs gewesen. Deshalb habe er im Anschluß an die große in der Presse referierte Krenlkonferenz in einer Sonderaudienz im Beisein der aller-nächsten Mitarbeiter und eines Dolmetschers Herrn Chruschtschow eine klare Antwort betreffend Wallenberg er-sucht. Herr Chruschtschow habe er-klärt: Seine Regierung könne leider nur auf jene Informationen hinweisen, die Außenminister Gromyko im Memo-randum vom 6. Februar 1957 der schwedischen Regierung mitgeteilt hatte.“

Bis 1957 hatte die Regierung der UdSSR auf alle schwedischen Noten konsequent erklärt: Wallenberg sei niemals russischer Gefangener gewe-sen, er hätte sich niemals auf sowjet-russischen Boden befunden, er sei wahrscheinlich durch deutsche Bomben, jedenfalls im Kampfgebiet in Ungarn ums Leben gekommen.

In Wirklichkeit war Wallenberg, der im Juli 1944 von der schwedischen Re-gierung als Legationssekretär nach Budapest geschickt wurde — mit der Spezialorder, den Rest der noch nicht in die Gaskammer deportierten Juden womöglich zu retten — als einziger ausländischer Diplomat in dem Millio-nen-Stadtteil Pest geblieben, als am 24. Dezember 1944 die letzten Trup-pen Pest verlassen und in den Stadtteil Buda jenseits des Donau zu-rückzogen und die Gruppe von Eich-mann per Flugzeug an die ungarisch-österreichische Grenze geflohen waren.

Als ihn der schwedische Gesandte aufforderte, nach Buda zu kommen, wo sich alle Missionen und Konsulate in relativer Sicherheit wahrten, hat er um die Erlaubnis, in Pest die Ankunft der Roten Armee abwarten zu dürfen und als Charge d'affaires (Geschäftsträger) mit dem sowjetischen Oberkommando im Interesse seiner Schutzleute verhan-deln zu dürfen.

Am 12. Januar kam er, die erste sowjetische Intendantin in Wallenbergs Legation. Wallenberg hat, zum Stadt-kommandanten gehört zu werden. Unter

seinen Schutz“ Raoul bat, vor-her nach Debrecen fahren zu dürfen, wo sich das Hauptquartier des Mar-schalls Malinowski (jetzt UdSSR-Ver-teidigungsminister) und des Hochkom-missars der Alliierten Waroschilow be-fand. Wallenberg bekam am 17. Januar die Erlaubnis, nach Debrecen zu fah-ren. Unter Eskorte von Militärpolizisten durfte er von seinem Personal Abschied nehmen. Er sagte zu Zeugen: „Ich fahre nach Debrecen. Ob als freier Mann oder Gefangener, weiß ich nicht.“

Am 16. Januar — also einen Tag vor dieser Reise — teilte das sowjetische Außenamt dem schwedischen Moskau-minister in einer Note mit, daß die Mi-litärbehörden Wallenberg und sein Eigentum unter ihren Schutz genom-men hatten.

Am 30. Januar 1945 wurde Wallen-berg in eine Zelle des Moskauer Ljubl-jankagefängnisses gebracht, wo sich der deutsche Attaché befand, der uns nach seiner Heimkehr unmittelbar nach sei-ner Übergabe in Fricoland eine aus-führliche Botschaft Wallenbergs über-brachte.

Trotz dieser offiziellen russischen „Quittungen“ leugneten die sowjeti-schen Behörden 12 Jahre lang, daß Wallenberg Sowjetgefangener sei. Und als wir erdrückendes Beweismaterial von vielen prominenten Heimkehrern, die in Gefängnissen mit Wallenberg Kontakt gehabt hatten, gesammelt hat-ten, das Ministerpräsident Erlander bei seinem Staatsbesuch 1956 in Moskau übergab, ließ sich die Sowjetregierung fast ein Jahr Zeit, um im Februar 1957 in einem Memorandum mitzuteilen: In keinem Gefängnis habe man irgend-einen Beweis für Wallenbergs Haft ge-funden. Nur zufällig einen handge-schriebenen Zettel eines inzwischen verstorbenen Gefängnisarztes, in wel-chem dieser den inzwischen als Sowjet-Feind brandierten Sicherheitschef Aba-kumow fragt, was er mit der Leiche eines verstorbenen Häftlings anfangen solle. Abakumow habe auf diesen Zet-tel geschrieben: Nicht chulieren, kre-mieren! Dieser Gefangene, so schloß der Memorandumverfasser, müsse Wal-lenberg gewesen sein.

Mündlich erklärten die Sowjetspre-cher: Zweifelte man an der Richtigkeit dieses Schlusses, dann gäbe es eben keinen Beweis dafür, daß der Diplomat sich überhaupt jemals in russischer Ge-fangenschaft befunden habe.

Schwedens Außenminister wies auf die Zeugnisaussagen hin, laut denen Wallenberg sich zu viel späteren Zeit-punkten, als dem im Memorandum von 1957 genannten „Todesdatum“, in noch in den 1960er Jahren in sowjetischen Gefängnissen befand. „Die Arbeit für Wallenbergs Rettung geht weiter“, er-klärte Schwedens neuer Außenminister.



DA

"Wallenberg dömdes 1947 till 25 år"

Från DN:s speciella medarbetare Inge Santner
WIEN, tisdag.

Raoul Wallenberg fick 1947 i Ljubjankafängelset i Moskva meddelande om att han av en rysk specialdomstol dömts till 25 års fängelse utan att han själv fått vara närvarande och utan möjlighet att försvara sig. Detta omtalar wienaren Franz L. som på tisdagen framträdde i Wientidningen Express och berättade om sitt möte med den svenske diplomaten i fängelseborgen Verchneursk i oktober 1953.

Frans L häktades som verksam i den österrikiska statspolisen av den sovjetiska ockupationsmakten och fördes till Sovjet. Han fick uppleva detta fruktansvärda år i Stalintidens läger. I oktober 1953 skulle Frans L få en smula omväxling i sin enformiga fängelsevistelse. Han hämtades av hemliga polisen ur sin cell i specialfängelset Verchneursk vid Tjeljabinsk och flyttades till en annan cell. Men man hade i förväg preparerat honom: L, som sedan 1947 inte hade träffat sin familj, kunde nu "förtjäna" sin hemresa.

Han skulle föras till en annan fänge och försöka vinna dennes förtroende och därefter utfråga honom om vad han hade haft i Budapest att göra, vilka kontakter han hade där och vilka som var hans uppdragsgivare. Denne man var den svenske diplomaten Raoul Wallenberg.

Fortf. sidan tjugu, spalt tre.

Wallenberg svårt misshandlad

Wallenberg...

(Forts. från sid. 1)

— Jag ville naturligtvis fara hem — det var min innerligaste önskan. Men kunde jag göra vad ryssarna begärde av mig? säger Franz L. Jag beslöt mig för att försöka med en list, tillfogar han för Express.

L lovade att ta sig an Wallenberg och snart stod han ansikte mot ansikte med honom i cellen. Diplo-

maten befann sig synbarligen i god kroppslig kondition, men föreföll själsligt bruten. Efter 24 timmar hade de båda lärt känna varandra så pass att wienaren tänkte sig kunna få Wallenbergs förtroende.

Under faran av att själv bli för-rädd talade han om sitt uppdrag för svensken. De båda rådslög om vad L skulle säga till polisen när man återkom för att hämta honom.

Svår misshandel

Wallenberg berättade för L vad han hade haft för sig sedan 1945,

och rans framställning har Frans L efter sin hemkomst lätt myndighe-terna ta del av.

Wallenberg bedyrade, enligt Ex-press, att han inte gjort sig skyldig till något spioneri. Han hade blott sysslat med uppgifter för Röda kor-sen sedan han efter krigets slut kom-mit till Budapest. Men snart anhölls han av NKVD (den hemliga ryska polisen) och inspärades i de mest skiftande källarvalv. Dagslånga för-hör och svår misshandel skulle få ho-nom att tala. Men diplomaten hade ingenting att säga. År 1946 överförde man honom till Baden vid Wien, det beryktade sätet för ryska ockupa-tionsmaktens hemliga polis. I slutet av samma år kom han till Sopron i Ungern, och till slut via Lwow till Moskva.

I den ryska huvudstaden lärde han efter hand känna de flesta fångelser inifrån. Sommaren 1947 erhöi han i Ljubjankafängelset meddelandet om att en specialdomstol dömt honom till 25 års fängelsestraff utan att han själv fått vara närvarande, utan möjlighet att försvara sig. Vid den tiden — sades det från rysk sida — hade Wallenberg dött.

Enligt vad Frans L vidare fick veta av Wallenberg hade man kort därefter fört honom till ett "tyst" lä-ger. År 1950 kom han till special-fängelset Verchne Oralsk. Det är en fästningsliknande byggnad på en höjd, som många där internerade ös-terrikare ännu har i bittert minne.

Wallenberg förbjöds där på det strängaste att skriva något och kunde inte heller träda i kontakt med någ-ra myndigheter. Han var död för världen. Har han sedan dess verkli-gen blivit det?

I fyra dagar stannade Franz L i cellen. Sedan hämtade man ut honom därifrån. Hemliga polisen ogillade dock att L fått dessa uppgifter av Wallenberg. Wienaren sattes under strängare kontroll och placerades i en cell tillsammans med fem ryska mördare.

Raoul Wallenberg är sedan dess försvunnen.

Ovanstående redogörelse bekräftar att Raoul Wallenberg levde år 1953, alltså sex år efter det att han skulle ha avlidit, enligt vad som påstods från rysk sida i februari 1957. Det bör emellertid påpekas att svenska regeringen har erhållit — och till ryska regeringen överlämnat — ett detaljerat material, av vilket fram-går att Wallenberg var vid liv om-kring 1960, med noggrann orisang-velse.

Flera detaljer i det nu publicera-de vittnesmålet är nya. Viktigast är meddelandet att Wallenberg 1947 skulle ha dömts till 25 års fängelse, ett straff som fastställdes samtidigt som han enligt rysk uppgift skulle ha avlidit. Det har av tidigare — i en svensk vitbok publicerade — vitt-nesmål framgått att de ryska fängel-semyndigheterna just sommaren 1947 visade ett speciellt intresse för alla som hade varit i kontakt med Wal-lenberg. Detta intresse får nu sin förklaring i att Wallenberg vid den-na tidpunkt dömdes till ett hårt straff.

Man utgår från att svenska rege-ringen inför och i samband med Christjens besök med kraft in-skärper det svenska kravet att få veta den fulla sanningen om Raoul Wallenberg samt att denne får åter-vända till Sverige. Mycket starka skäl talar för att Wallenberg alltså är i livet.

2

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ROUTING

1	2	3	4
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : VIENNA

ACTION: [REDACTED]

INFO: [REDACTED]

SECRET 191417Z

DIN INFO [REDACTED]

19 JUN 1959 10347

1. VIENNA DAILY KURIER 19 JUN CARRIES TWO PAGE ARTICLE ON SWEDISH DIPLOMAT RAGEL WALLEMBERG. SUBSTANCE IS THAT WALLEMBERG STILL ALIVE AND THAT FORMER CELL MATE OF HIS IN MOSCOW PRISON, NOW LIVING IN VIENNA, WAS THREATENED BY SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE ON 3 JUN NOT TO REVEAL ANY INFO RE WALLEMBERG. THIS ALLEGEDLY IN CONNECTION WITH KHRUSHCHEV VISIT SCANDINAVIA.

2. SOURCE OF KURIER ARTICLE IS FRANZ LAUFER [REDACTED] NOTORIOUS INTEL FABRICATOR, ONE TIME AGENT OF AMERICAN ARMY INTEL AND OF AUSTRIAN STAPO, ARRESTED BY SOVIETS 47 AND JAILED TIL 53. AUSTRIANS ISSUED BURN NOTICE 1959, SUGGESTING LAUFER PSYCHO.

3. WE DISCOUNT ABOVE KURIER ARTICLE BECAUSE IT CONTAINS MANY ALLEGED DETAILS TO WHICH LAUFER COULD NOT POSSIBLY HAVE HAD ACCESS IN MOSCOW AND BECAUSE INCONCEIVABLE LAUFER WOULD HAVE KEPT INFO ON WALLEMBERG, IF HE HAD ANY, SECRET AFTER HIS RETURN AUSTRIA AND DURING PROLONGED LEGAL BATTLE ON HIS RESTITUTION CLAIM AGAINST AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT.

SECRET

201-5925

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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Chief, WE
PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Chief, WE Division	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	[REDACTED]		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	Operations Raoul WALLENBERG		MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			

A.R. For Your Information

1. On 2 February 1965, Swedish TV presented a documentary on the Raoul WALLENBERG case. This program has again caused some interest in the case and has led to a statement by the Government that the case will never be considered closed as long as any aspect of WALLENBERG's fate remains subject to question. The TV program's disclosure of an American offer to intervene on behalf of the Swedish government with Soviet authorities in an effort to develop information concerning WALLENBERG's fate, has been the basis for renewed press and public comment on this case. This has been sharpened with the concurrent disclosure that the Swedish Government apparently turned this offer down.

2. Forwarded herewith for WALLENBERG's 201 are press resumes of the latest intermezzo.

[REDACTED]

Attachment:
Press clippings

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WE w/att
2 - [REDACTED] w/att

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201-5965

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [REDACTED]	DATE 10 February 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER [REDACTED]

Dagens NYHETER

9 FEB 65

Okklart om svenskt nej till Wallenbergaktion

Utrikesdepartementet har nu fått tillgång till den telegramväxling som ägde rum i april 1945 mellan State Department i Washington och de amerikanska ambassaderna i Stockholm och Moskva angående diplomatisk hjälp från USA i forskningarna efter Raoul Wallenberg. Av ett telegram från dåvarande ambassadör Averell Harriman till Washington framgår att den svenska legationen i Moskva inte ansåg att en amerikansk framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet skulle vara önskvärd.

På utrikesdepartementet framhåller man att det är fortfarande oklart hur det svenska avböjandet gått till — och om avböjandet över huvud taget kom från svenskt håll.

Dåvarande svenske ambassadören i Moskva, Staffan Söderblom, rapporterade i efterhand till UD om kontakterna i Moskva, som kommit till stånd efter ett telegram från dåvarande amerikanske ambassadören i Stockholm, Herschel Johnson. I ambassadör Söderbloms rapport heter det att amerikanska ambassaden i Moskva torde ha svarat Herschel Johnson "att den utgår ifrån att man genom State Department vänt sig till USA:s representation i Ungern. Ambassaden torde i övrigt svårligen anse något vara att göra från amerikansk sida."

I ambassadör Harrimans rapport till State Department den 12 april 1945 heter det däremot att svenska legationen förklarat sig inte ha anledning att tro att sovjetiska vederbörande inte gjort vad de kunde i fråga om efterforskningarna. Legationen ansåg inte amerikansk framställning önskvärd, rapporterade Harriman.

På UD:s pressbyrå framhöll man på måndagskvällen att det kan förhålla sig så att ambassadör Söderblom inte bedömde amerikansk hjälp i fallet Wallenberg som fruktbar. Ambassadören hade tidigare själv gjort flera framstötter till sovjetiska myndigheter utan resultat. Men det kan å andra sidan, framhåller pressbyrån, ha varit den amerikanska ambassaden som anser att även-



Sveriges ambassadör i Moskva 1941-46 Staffan Söderblom.

tuell USA-hjälp inte skulle tjäna mycket till.

Innehållet i telegrammen återgavs i ett TV-program den 2 februari i år.

De tre telegrammen har i översättning följande lydelse:

Secretary of State, Washington.

Stockholm den 4 april 1945.

Svenska utrikesdepartementet är mycket bekymrat över att attachén vid legationen, Raoul Wallenberg, försvunnit. Enligt oberoende kräftade radiomeddelanden har han mördats. Svenska legationen i Moskva har instruerats att begära ryska regeringens bistånd att fastställa Wallenbergs öde.

Den 4 april kl 17 sändes detta till Moskva:

Vi hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern och skulle mycket uppskatta varje stöd som vår ambassad i Moskva kan lämna den svenska legationen i Moskva i denna sak.

JOHNSON

Am. Embassy.

Washington 9 april 1945.

Följande till Harriman från departementet och krigsflyktingsstyrelsen (War Refugee Board):

Departementet och styrelsen skulle uppskatta om ni gäve allt möjligt stöd åt svenska legationen i Moskva vid dess hemställan till ryska regeringen om bistånd att fastställa attachéns vid svenska legationen i Budapest, Raoul Wallenbergs, öde. Krigsflyktingsstyrelsen hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern på grund av hans utomordentliga arbete för att skydda judar och andra offer för fiendens förtryck under fiendens ockupation av Ungern.

STETTINIUS

Secretary of State, Washington.

Moskva 12 april 1945.

Svenska legationen i Moskva informerades sent i december av sovjetiska utrikesministeriet att Wallenberg var i säkerhet i Budapest. Legationen mottog senare en rapport från den svenska representationen i Bukarest att Wallenberg hade lämnat Budapest ensam med bil med okänt färdmål och att han försvunnit. Legationen i Moskva ombad därpå sovjetiska myndigheterna att söka spåra honom, vilket de lovade att göra. Svenskarna säger, att de icke ha någon anledning tro att ryssarna inte gör vad de kan, och att de inte anse att en framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet från vår sida skulle vara önskvärd. Medlemmarna av den svenska representationen i Budapest förväntas anlända till Moskva inom några få dagar på väg till Stockholm och de kan möjligen ha ytterligare upplysningar om Wallenberg.

HARRIMAN

AM OSSA-13732
10 Feb 65

STOCKHOLMS TIDNINGEN
7 FEB 65

Telegramväxlingen om Wallenberg frisläpps av UD

I TV-programmet om Raoul Wallenberg 2 februari sändes och återgavs innehållet av en telegramväxling i april 1945 mellan State Department i Washington och de amerikanska ambassaderna i Stockholm och Moskva om möjligheten av amerikanskt diplomatiskt stöd vid efterforskningarna av Wallenberg. Texterna till tre meddelanden som ingick i telegramväxlingen har numera ställts till svenska utrikesdepartementets förfogande.

I ett telegram av 4 april 1945 till State Department hemställde dåvarande amerikanske ambassadören i Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, att amerikanska ambassaden i Moskva måtte stödja svenska legationen i Moskva i dess strävanden att genom de sovjetiska myndigheterna fastställa Wallenbergs öde.

I ett telegram av 9 april 1945 instruerade State Department sin ambassad i Moskva att ge allt erforderligt stöd åt svenska legationen.

Dåvarande amerikanske ambassadören i Moskva, Averell Harriman, rapporterade i ett telegram av 12 april 1945 att svenska legationen förklarat sig inte ha anledning att tro att sovjetiska vederbörande inte gjorde vad de kunde i fråga om dessa efterforskningar. Legationen ansåg inte att en amerikansk framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet skulle vara önskvärd.

Telegrammen avspeglar kontakter som under krigets slutskede förekom mellan utrikesdepartementet och amerikanska ambassaden i Stockholm samt mellan de svenska och amerikanska beskickningarna i Moskva angående de pågående efterforskningarna av Wallenberg. Från UD. Svenska legationen rapporterade i efterhand till utrikesdepartementet om kontakterna i Moskva.

Legationen framhöll i sin rapport att amerikanska ambassaden i Moskva torde ha svarat Herschel Johnson "att den utgår ifrån att man genom State Department vänt sig till Amerikas representation i Ungern. Ambassaden torde i övrigt svårigen anse något vara att göra från amerikansk sida".

Av utrikesdepartementets vitbok om Raoul Wallenberg framgår att en svensk demarche gjordes den 25 april 1945 hos de sovjetiska myndigheterna i ärendet.

De tre telegrammen har i översättning följande lydelse:

Secretary of State, Washington
1231, 4 april kl 5 e m.
Stockholm 4 april 1945.

Svenska utrikesdepartementet är mycket bekymrat över att attachén vid legationen i Budapest, Raoul Wallenberg, försvunnit. Enligt oberoende radiomeddelanden har han mördats. Svenska legationen i Moskva har instruerats att begära ryska regeringens bistånd att fastställa Wallenbergs öde.

I mitt 14 den 4 april kl 5 e m sändes detta till Moskva.

Vi hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern och skulle mycket uppskatta varje stöd som vår ambassad i Moskva kan lämna svenska legationen i Moskva i denna sak. JOHNSON

Embassy, Moskva.

Washington 9 april 1945.

Följande till Harriman från departementet och krigsflyktingstyrelsen (War Refugee Board).

Vi hänvisar till Stockholms nr 14 den 4 april till er, samt till departementet som nr 1251 den 4 april.

Departementet och styrelsen skulle uppskatta om ni gäve allt möjligt stöd åt svenska legationen i Moskva vid dess hemställan till ryska regeringen om bistånd att fastställa attachéns vid svenska legationen i Budapest, Raoul Wallenberg, öde.

Krigsflyktingstyrelsen hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern på grund av hans utomordentliga arbete för att skydda judar och andra offer för fiendens förtryck under fiendens okkupation av Ungern. STEITINIUS

Secretary of State, Washington
1137, 12 april kl 10.

Moskva 12 april 1945.

Svenska legationen i Moskva informeras sent i december av sovjetiska utrikesministeriet att Wallenberg (edert 824 9 april kl 7 e m) vore i säkerhet i Budapest. Legationen mottog senare en rapport från den svenska representationen i Bukarest att Wallenberg hade lämnat Budapest ensam med bil med okänt färdmål och att han försvunnit. Legationen i Moskva ombad därpå sovjetiska myndigheterna att söka spåra honom, vilket de lovade att göra. Svenskarna säger, att de icke ha någon anledning tro att ryssarna inte gör vad de kan, och att de inte anse att en framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet från vår sida skulle vara önskvärd. (Sämt till departementet som nr 1137. Sämt till Stockholm som nr 16.)

Medlemmarna av den svenska representationen i Budapest förväntas anlända till Moskva inom några få dagar på väg till Stockholm och de kan möjligen ha ytterligare upplysningar om Wallenberg.

HARRIMAN

AH OSSA-13732
10 Feb 65

201-5925
10 Feb 65

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
TO	Chief, WE		XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.				NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	[REDACTED]			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	Operations RAOUL WALLENBERG			MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES				
For your information				
Forwarded for the record is the DAGENS NYHETER report of 12 June 1965 which quotes Prime Minister ERLANDER that the Russians continue to claim that they are unable to find WALLENBERG. ERLANDER took up the WALLENBERG case again with Soviet authorities during his current State Visit [REDACTED]				
Attachment: News Article				
Distribution: 3 - Chief, WE, w/att 2 - [REDACTED] w/att				
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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE		
	[REDACTED]	16 June 1965		
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER		
		201-5925		

Oförändrad Sovjetattityd i fallet Raoul Wallenberg

Från DN:s Moskva-korrespondent Lars Bringert

MOSKVA fredag.

Maktskiftet i Kreml har av allt att döma inte inneburit någon förändrad sovjetisk inställning till fallet Wallenberg. Statsminister Erlander tog på fredagen vid ett två och en halv timme långt samtal med den sovjetiske regeringschefen Alexej Kosygin åter upp frågan, men utan att nå några nya resultat.

— Vårt samtal ger ingen anledning till stor optimism, förklarade hr Erlander efteråt. På ryskt håll anser man sig fortfarande inte kunna finna Wallenberg.

Frågan är dock ännu inte utagerad. Herrar Erlander och Kosygin skall fortsätta fredagens samtal på torsdag, när statsministern kommer tillbaka från Krim, och då avser man åtminstone på svenskt håll att ta upp Wallenberg igen. Samma dag skall statsministern också utfärda det officiella programmet träffa den sovjetiske partichefen Leonid Brezjnev.

Med sig till Moskva hade hr Erlander inget direkt nytt Wallenbergmaterial, men väl nya synpunkter på det gamla. Vid fredagens samtal bad han också att få ta del av de ryska undersökningar som på svensk anmodan gjorts i Sovjet, men något svar tycks man dock ännu inte ha fått.

Samma synpunkter

Mycket tyder alltså på att de synpunkter Kreml kommer att framsöka i stort blir desamma som Nikita Chrusjtjev förde med sig till Stockholm i fjol sommar.

Utöver Wallenberg togs på fredagen inga andra fall med försvunna svenskar upp, eftersom man från svensk sida inte hade något nytt material att presentera.

Däremot uttryckte hr Erlander sin stora tillfredsställelse med det ökade antal utresetillstånd som sedan Chrusjtjevbesöket gjorts sovjetiska medborgare med svensk anknytning. Bland de senaste dagarna har 25 nya ansökningar beviljats.

Sedan juli 1961 har 157 baltar fått utresetillstånd för att besöka svenska släktingar och 18 för att bosätta sig i Sverige. Som bekant har också elva Svenskbybor lämnat Sovjetunionen. För 18 vuxna och 18 minderåriga invånare i den lilla svenskbyn Verbyvka i Ukraina ligger alljämt ansökningar liggande. Fredagens samtal med Kosygin

blev en halvtimme längre än beräknat, och under tiden fick Sovjets president Anastas Mikojan sitta på sitt ämbetsrum i Kreml och vänta på den svenske statsministerns planerade artighetsbesök. Men trots programöverdraget hann man ändå inte gå igenom allt, utan tid för ett nytt samtal bestämdes alltså till nästa torsdag. För säkerhets skull antecknade Kosygin egenhändigt tillägget i hr Erlanders personliga program.

Den avgjort största delen av tiden i Kosygins arbetsrum -- han har övertagit Stalins och Chrusjtjevs gamla -- ägnades åt FN:s finansiella kris. Från svensk sida hävdades att man hör bortse från förflutna strider och i stället inrikta sig på att finna en metod för att lösa betalningsproblemen, samtidigt undvika debatter om tolkningsfrågor och skapa regler som i framtiden effektivt förhindrar kriser som denna.

Hr Erlander förklarade efteråt att den svenska attityden går ut på att man borde stryka ett streck över hela den juridiska debatten.

Såvitt man ännu vet gav Kosygin inga direkta svar och framförde heller inte några nya konstruktiva ryska förslag i anslutning till den svenska propå. Men i sitt tal vid den ryska regeringens stora lunch i Kreml något senare sade han:

— Vi är övertygade om att man inte kan stärka Förenta nationerna endast genom fromma önskiner...

På båda sidor förklarade man sig dock tillmöta Förenta nationerna stor betydelse.

En annan av de frågor som kom att dominera samtalet i Kreml var nedrustningsförhandlingarna i Genève. Hr Erlander betonade vikten av att nya sammanträden snart inleddes och förklarade att man på svensk sida anser att tanken på partiella framsteg bör accepteras. Ett mindre framsteg är ju

också ett steg i rätt riktning, eftersom det kan medföra att båda blocken får ansvar för att ytterligare steg följer.

Från rysk sida betonade man att även ett litet framsteg kräver ömsesidigt förtroende, och därmed framgick alltså att Kreml i dag inte anser att något sådant existerar stormakterna emellan.

Förhandlingar

Man kom också in på kriget i Vietnam. Den svenska regeringen anser, hävdades det, att spara förhandlingar med sikte på en fredlig lösning framstår som ytterst angelägna. Liknande synpunkter framförde den norske utrikesministern Einar Gerhardsen vid sitt besök i Kreml för två veckor sedan. Men den ryska attityden är alltså, vilken framgick av Kosygins intervju med de svenska journalistererna något senare, att sådana förhandlingar inte kan föras med någon annan än "det vietnamesiska folket självt".

Det svensk-sovjetiska handelsutbytet togs så upp och bl a uppehöll man sig en stund vid de pågående förhandlingarna om stora leveranser till Sovjetunionen där många svenska industrier, bland dem Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad, är inblandade. Men om hur förhandlingarna fortlöper, när de kan tänkas bli avslutade och hur stort belopp kontraktet kommer att löpa på ville statsministern på fredagskvällen inte uttala sig.

Däremot nämndes aldrig Kekkoneplanen om en atomvapenfri zon i Skandinavien, som normalt är ett kärt sovjetiskt spörsmål, men det är möjligt att tidsnöden avgjorde. När samtalet avslutades hade ju president Mikojan som sagt redan suttit en halvtimme och väntat på hr Erlanders formella artighetsbesök.

Den genomfördes dock på traditionellt sätt och sedan bjöd alltså

sovjetiska staten på jättelunch i Kreml med kaviar, piroger, hemsaltad lax, viltallad, pärlhönssoppa, fiskfilé i champagne, kalvstek med grönsaker, jordgubbsglass, kaffe med småkakor, frukt, vodka, grusiska viner, champagne och konjak.

Omkring 50 personer var närvarande, bland dem partichefen Leonid Brezjnev, Kosygin förstås, försvarsminister Rodion Malinovskij, utrikesminister Alexej Gromyko, Moskvas nye borgmästare Vladimir Promyslov, handelsminister Pjotr Mazurov och Ukrainas partichef Pjotr Sjelest. Däremot var president Mikojan inte med.

ATT # 140
COSA 14077

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201-5925

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DIA CINC [REDACTED]

155-52371

1. [REDACTED] REQUEST SWEDISH FORNOFF TO ASK STATE EITHER HERE OR WASH FOR ANY PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED INFO RE VALLENBERG. THEY REQUEST WE MAKE PARALLEL CHECK AND INFORM THEM ASAP

2. SOS WILL RELEASE WHITE PAPER ON VALLENBERG STORY 16 SEPT.

SECRET

STATE

[REDACTED] RE VALLENBERG AND .G

BT

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155-5925

15 Sept 65

BRIG : [REDACTED]
 UNIT : [REDACTED]
 EXT : [REDACTED]
 DATE : 21 SEPTEMBER 65

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TO : [REDACTED]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: W68 INFO: VP, FILE [REDACTED] COPY CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, 44521

TO [REDACTED] INFO [REDACTED] CITE DIR 21 Sept 65 18

TO [REDACTED] INFO [REDACTED] CITE DIR 21 Sept 65 18

DIR 44521

RES: [REDACTED] (IN 52371)*
 CIA

HAS NO INFO NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO SWEDEN.

END OF MESSAGE

ANV	FI
PS	INDEX
ABSTRACT	X INDEX

WE COMMENT: [REDACTED] asked for a parallel check of ROBARC records to be made as a complement to the check with State being made by the Swedish Foreign Office.

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201-005925

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TO

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FROM

SUBJECT

Chief, WE Division

Chief, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Operations
Raoul WALLENBERG

XX

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MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

A.R. FYI

Forwarded herewith is some of the Swedish news coverage of the Government of Sweden's White Paper on the Raoul WALLENBERG case upon its release to the public. A copy of the White Paper has been ordered and will be forwarded to you as soon as it is received.



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- 2 - [REDACTED] /o/att

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DATE

24 September 1965

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SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

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Newspaper clippings

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SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

Wallenburg, Raoul.

201-

5925

FORM 867
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
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

[This Bureau has no objection to your furnishing the information set out in referenced letter which you desire to pass to the Swedish Government; however, prior to passing this information, you may desire to review [redacted] statements made prior to August 12, 1959. In addition, you may wish to review the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) records concerning [redacted] INS Number [redacted] wherein he advised INS that the subject was murdered in Moscow, Russia, in 1946. (S)]

In the event you do pass the information set out in the referenced letter to the Swedish Government, [redacted] should be described as a source "of undetermined reliability." This Bureau does not desire to be identified as your source. (S)

Since we have no investigative interest in the subject and since we are unaware of the facts surrounding the subject's disappearance, we are not in a position to know whether [redacted] is telling the truth in his statement of August 12, 1959; however, we have no objection to your interviewing [redacted] concerning the subject. For your information, when [redacted] was interviewed, it was necessary for this Bureau to utilize the services of a Hungarian interpreter due to [redacted] inability to properly express himself in the English language.

In regard to the character of [redacted], your attention is invited to a memorandum dated August 27, 1959, at Los Angeles, California, entitled [redacted] also known as [redacted] which was furnished you in an envelope marked "obscene."



~~SECRET~~